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THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT



***Making the Joint Planning and Execution Process more Responsive
to the Combatant Commander***

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature_____

17 May 2004

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has dramatically decreased its overseas basing of military forces. This trend is likely to continue as DoD considers plans to reduce the footprint of permanently assigned forces in many Western European countries with rotational units. As a result, the success of future U.S. military operations will depend on the combat capability of rotating forces already in theater along with our ability to rapidly deploy additional forces from CONUS locations. Unfortunately, the current Joint Deployment Planning (JDP) process is too cumbersome and inflexible to satisfactorily address combatant commanders' needs and the inevitable changes in priorities once an operation is underway.

This study will first evaluate current doctrine regarding the deployment planning and execution process followed by a review of the adequacy of its procedures during recent operations. Systemic problem areas will then be identified along with recommendations on ways to mitigate their negative effects, both at the department and more importantly, combatant command levels. Finally, this analysis will recognize ongoing efforts aimed at improving deployment planning and execution responsiveness in support of combatant commanders' requirements.

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“Deployment planning and execution were much more akin to those required during the Cold War than to those required for force projection by our country in the 21st century.”

General Tommy Franks, Testimony on Iraq, July 9, 2003.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has dramatically decreased its overseas basing of military forces. This trend is likely to continue as the Department of Defense (DoD) considers plans to reduce the footprint of permanently assigned forces in many Western European countries with rotational units.ⁱ As a result, the success of future U.S. military operations will depend on the combat capability of rotating forces already in theater along with our ability to rapidly deploy additional forces from Continental, United States (CONUS) locations. Unfortunately, the current Joint Deployment Planning (JDP) process is too cumbersome and inflexible to satisfactorily address combatant commanders’ needs and the inevitable changes in priorities once an operation is underway.

Despite numerous deployments in recent years, revisions to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) failed to mitigate many of the problems encountered during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). In fact, many of the issues that surfaced during OIF were also noted in earlier operations, including the first Gulf War. To complicate matters, new political considerations add to the complexity of current operations and place more of a requirement for flexibility than JOPES currently offers. For example, basing issues frequently require time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) to be changed, thus significantly altering the disposition and location of forces and their timelines for employment. OIF clearly demonstrated the complex nature of today’s operations and the requirement for a deployment planning and execution system that provides the combatant commander with the ability to react to unanticipated events in a timely and effective manner.

This study will first evaluate current doctrine regarding the deployment planning and execution process followed by a review of the adequacy of its procedures during recent operations. Systemic problem areas will then be identified along with recommendations on ways to mitigate their negative effects, both at the department and more importantly, combatant command levels. Finally, this analysis will recognize ongoing efforts aimed at improving deployment planning and execution responsiveness in support of combatant commanders' requirements.

What does Joint Doctrine say?

In the fiscal year (FY) 2002 National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense was tasked to "transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results."ⁱⁱⁱ Previous National Military Strategies and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review also stressed the importance of "rapidly and effectively deploying and sustaining US military power from multiple, dispersed locations" and advocated developing a power projection capability to respond with "force packages that can be adapted rapidly to the environment."ⁱⁱⁱ More recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Joint Vision 2020 emphasized the goal of employing "focused logistics" procedures that "provide the joint force with the right personnel, equipment, and supplies at the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations."^{iv}

In view of these objectives and in support of combatant commanders' requirements, DoD established a Joint Operation and Planning Execution System (JOPES) that is iterative and includes both deliberate planning and crisis action procedures.

Turning first to the Deliberate Planning Process, combatant commanders are tasked to prepare various plans based on guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). These plans, normally developed in peacetime, are intended to facilitate the rapid transition to a “crisis response for potential, perceived, and identified threats to US security interests.”^v To assist commanders, the force planning step in JOPES outlines procedures for determining force requirements, shortfalls, and the conduct of risk analysis if shortfalls remain unresolved. Force planning is also the step where Service components commanders “time-phase” their forces in accordance with the supported commander's concept of operations. In essence, forces and sustainment assets are: identified by the supported commander, sourced by the Services, supporting commanders, and various Defense agencies, validated for strategic lift purposes (by the supported combatant commander), and submitted to USTRANSCOM for scheduling. Finally, requirements that exceed the available asset projections are identified to the CJCS for adjudication (e.g., forces, strategic lift, support assets, etc.).^{vi}

The Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) process is the vehicle used to capture assigned, augmentation, and supporting forces to be deployed to the area of operations. For global and regional plans, a complete TPFDD is normally built and fully resourced to the limit of available resources and at a minimum, represents the first ten days of airlift and first thirty days of sealift requirements. The normal TPFDD refinement process is an iterative process of refining forces, logistics, and transportation data in order to insure that TPFDDs remain relevant in support of combatant command plans and their associated timelines.^{vii}

Alternatively, crisis action planning begins with plans developed during the deliberate planning process and “continues through course of action (COA) development and selection,

operation plans and orders development and implementation; and ends when the requirement is canceled, the operation is terminated, or the crisis is satisfactorily resolved.”^{viii} In time-sensitive situations, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC)¹ executes established Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared plans. Although deliberate planning is based on the most current intelligence estimates, it is unlikely that any deliberate plan will be executed without some modifications, especially in terms of forces, resources, and strategic lift availability. In essence, CAP procedures serve as the transition from peacetime to possible military operations, including operations other than war.

Current doctrine also tasks Service components to “develop the Service aspects of the concept, determine force and resource requirements, and to build TPFDDs to implement appropriate concepts.”^{ix} Throughout a crisis, the supported commander remains in close contact with the Services and supporting commanders concerning possible future events and/or actions that may require additional support. As a supporting commander, USTRANSCOM is responsible for the transportation aspects of worldwide strategic mobility planning (deliberate and crisis), coordinating global strategic mobility requirements, and optimizing the use of high-demand, low density strategic lift assets. A key deployment task for USTRANSCOM planners is to ensure that validated “early deployers” are quickly scheduled in accordance with WARNING and/or ALERT order guidance.

In summary, when firm requirements and priorities have been established, the supported commander notifies the JPEC that the force requirements are ready for sourcing. This action signals force providing organizations to provide specific unit movement data in JOPES for

¹ The JPEC includes the: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Chiefs of Staff, selected members of the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and their subordinate commands, Defense Agencies. Joint

the first increment of movement (first seven days of airlift and the first thirty days of sealift). As mentioned, once these actions are completed the supported commander validates and submits the TPFDD to the lift providers (USTRANSCOM) for scheduling purposes. Currently, the TPFDD time standard is seventy-two hours from notification and receipt of a mission by the supported commander to his validation of the TPFDD for the first seven days of the deployment flow (note: the initial four days of airlift schedules are produced within thirty-six hours of TPFDD submission). The initial sealift schedules are entered when ship selection is made and prior to the ship's arrival at its first sea port of embarkation (SPOE).^x

It is also important to note various ongoing initiatives to refine the current Joint Deployment and Execution Process. In addition to emphasizing the use of collaborative tools and standardized data formats, the Department of Defense has published various directives outlining new policies, procedures, and assigning responsibilities. DoD Directive 5158.5, *Joint Deployment Process Owner*, November 12, 2001 designated the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command as the DoD Joint Deployment Process Owner. In this capacity, his key tasks are to “ensure joint deployment and redeployment processes support the challenges of joint operations, by ensuring processes are linked by joint doctrine, fully interoperable information systems and the necessary training.” Currently, JFCOM, in conjunction with selected commands, is investigating various approaches aimed at improving JOPES flexibility and its overall responsiveness.^{xi}

Joint Doctrine in Practice

Lessons learned from recent operations identified systemic challenges and issues associated with the current Joint Deployment Planning and Execution process. The following examples illustrate some of the major reoccurring findings.

Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, April 13 1995.

Somalia: The 28,000 troops that deployed to Somalia in support of Operation RESTORE HOPE represented a significant deployment challenge. The requirement to establish strategic air bridges due to the reduction of U.S. forward operating bases added to the complexity of the operation. In addition, current information on the condition of air and sea terminals in country was severely limited. Despite these challenges, Operation RESTORE HOPE was characterized as a “deployment success.” 986 airlift missions moved over 33,000 passengers and more than 32,000 short tons of cargo. Eleven ships, including five fast-sealift vessels moved 365,000 tons of cargo into theater and over 14 million gallons of fuel into a very austere environment.^{xii}

As with any large operation, there are always lessons that can be learned. For example, strong opinions were expressed concerning the adequacy of the JOPES process during this operation. Many complained about the system's lack of user-friendliness, the inflexibility of its procedures, and the difficulty of importing data from multiple sources. Related to this issue is the built-in conflict between the need to administer the "system" in a disciplined manner and the equally important need for flexibility to respond to combatant commanders' requests and unforeseen events.^{xiii}

Another deployment lesson learned in Somalia concerns "write permission" or the ability to make changes in the TPFDD files. Prior to deployment, and after ARCENT (Army Forces, Central Command) planners had laboriously constructed the TPFDD, subordinate commands made substantial changes to units' deployment dates. The wholesale nature of the changes forced ARCENT planners to hurriedly make hundreds of corrections to ensure people, equipment and lift were properly sequenced and in the correct configuration.^{xiv}

Data discrepancies also caused problems in updating and executing the TPFDD. Because the TPFDD reflects the combatant commander's decision concerning the types of units to be sent and when they enter the theater, it was extremely important that unit identification codes were standardized and used by all Services. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army organized most of its deployment data using codes different from the standard Unit Line Numbers (ULN), causing great difficulty in insuring scarce airlift assets were fully optimized.^{xv}

Finally, in addition to the standardization issues, inaccuracies in TPFDD information also caused persistent problems in maintaining accurate in-transit visibility. In some instances, telephone calls, faxes, and visual checks were conducted to verify that airfield "ramp-reality" matched requirements listed in the various data bases. As a result of inaccurate entries and "dated" information, deployment planning and execution was a constant challenge throughout much of the operation.^{xvi}

Kosovo: For Operation ALLIED FORCE, the United States drew upon forces deployed worldwide, including units based in CONUS. Even with a compressed timeline and the vast distances involved, deployment operations were also considered a success. Like Somalia, Operation ALLIED FORCE, was not problem-free and required Herculean efforts on the part of transportation planners to overcome significant movement challenges.

First, the time-constrained nature of this operation added to the difficulty of the task for deployment planners. In fact, much of the data for Operation ALLIED FORCE was developed in weeks (vice months or longer used in many deliberate planning cycles). Further complicating deployment planning was the need for the TPFDD to be sensitive to changes in the operational situation. This requirement was especially evident when political and operational imperatives forced a shift in basing from the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia to Albania. As a result, a large portion of the TPFDD had to be rapidly modified.^{xvii}

Second, it was vitally important that the many “feeder systems” involved in the development of the TPFDD be compatible. Unfortunately, the limited interoperability of some of these systems created significant friction at all levels of the deployment planning process.^{xviii} This situation was especially problematic given the time-constrained nature of the crisis.

Next, as in Somalia, Operation ALLIED FORCE planners experienced an austere transportation infrastructure that limited deployment options and increased deployment timelines. In many cases, these problems could have been mitigated if an early assessment of infrastructure limitations had been conducted in enough time to ensure the necessary materiel handling equipment was deployed. Here again, deliberate planning efforts can provide valuable regional insights, especially in crisis action situations when there is limited time to conduct extensive infrastructure assessments.^{xix}

Finally, the lack of adequate in-transit visibility further complicated deployment operations in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE. For example, while diverting Air Force units to alternate air bases, the deployment system was unable to adjust the movement of the associated support and maintenance equipment. As a result, without adequate in-transit visibility, commanders were severely limited in their ability to fully adjust units’ movements or to react to changing circumstances in the AOR.^{xx}

Iraq: In a more recent operation, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) used the Request For Forces (RFF) process in support of deployments for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The RFF process was selected over the normal TPFDD refinement procedures

which were viewed as lengthy, complicated, and manpower intensive. In a speech before the Defense Writers Group on September 24, 2003, General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated “It was a conscious decision to do away with the TPFDD [during OIF] once we realized that the TPFDD process could no longer support the decision making of the commander.”^{xxi} Developing a *new* TPFDD after more than 118,000 personnel had already deployed to the CENTCOM AOR was estimated to require more time than was available. It is also important to note that the personnel who would normally participate in TPFDD refinement conferences were already fully engaged in executing deployments requested by previous CENTCOM RFFs.^{xxii}

The Joint Staff therefore recommended that the TPFDD refinement process be replaced by RFFs/DEPORDs. Unfortunately, the CJCS Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Current Operations Team (COT) was quickly overwhelmed by the number of RFFs and was forced to request that CENTCOM prioritize its requirements given their time-sensitive and reactionary nature.

Summary of Systemic Challenges/Issues

Although not all-inclusive, the following issues represent a compilation of some of the major challenges and issues from recent operations associated with the deployment planning and execution process.

1. *The need for discipline in administering the "system" versus the equally important requirement for flexibility to respond to combatant commander requests and unforeseen events.* As seen in previous operations, the lack of TPFDD responsiveness led to the use of RFFs and the inefficient employment of strategic lift resources. Although the RFF/DEPORD

process was effective during OIF, it may be insufficient and counterproductive in extended operations.

2. *Data discrepancies caused problems in executing and adjusting TPFDDs.* With multiple feeder systems, there were few policies and procedures that were consistently adhered to during the TPFDD development and refinement cycles. In addition, the incompatibility of systems and the difficulty associated with importing accurate data caused persistent problems with in-transit visibility. Without this capability, the commander's ability to adjust the flow of forces in a timely manner was severely limited.

3. *The need for personnel trained in all aspects of deployment planning and execution operations.* In addition to improving the "user friendliness" of deployment planning and execution tools, supported and supporting combatant commands must ensure personnel remain proficient and cross-trained in multiple deployment operations tasks. Unfortunately, many staffs had a minimal number of "indispensable individuals" upon whom the success of deployment operations normally rested.

4. *Current information on the condition of air and sea terminals in country was lacking.* In many cases, austere transportation infrastructure limited deployment options and increase deployment timelines. As a result, regional assessments played an important role in identifying infrastructure shortfalls along with the support assets required early in an operation.

Recommendations

Although the primary focus of this study is to identify actions the combatant commander can take at his level, it is also important to *briefly* identify actions that should be considered at the department level. Given the Joint Staff's and specifically, Joint Forces Command's

(JFCOM) responsibility for developing and promulgating joint doctrine, the following issues are presented for consideration.

First, doctrine, procedures, and tools must be standardized and enforced. For example, although the Defense Collaborative Tool Suite (DCTS) has been selected as the DoD standard for deployment operations, other tools are currently in use at various combatant commands.^{xxiii} In addition, the lack of compatibility of many of these tools negatively impacts on JOPES responsiveness and the timely support of combatant command plans and their associated deployment timelines.

Second, doctrine must also emphasize the importance of parallel planning and the involvement of logisticians/transporters in the development and execution of operations plans. For example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Planning Policies and Procedures, (Volume I), states that once plans are created they are passed to “USTRANSCOM for assessment.” As a result, valuable time is lost when courses of action (COA) are developed that are unsupportable given mobilization and strategic lift timeline realities.

Third, although current joint doctrine provides sufficient deliberate planning and crisis action guidance, it fails to adequately address the post “line of departure” phase of an operation when flexibility and responsiveness are most needed. According to CJCSM 3122.01, Crisis Action procedures in Phase VI conclude with the NCA’s [President and SECDEF] decision to “execute an operations order” and the CINC’s [combatant commander] actions to execute the order (followed by “crisis resolution”). What is not adequately addressed are the policies, procedures, and responsibilities once an operation is underway. In fact, CJCSM 3122.01 fails to address the activities of JPEC members in Phase VI, as outlined

in the other phases. The figure below illustrates the current crisis action procedures along with recommended changes (e.g., addition of “**Phase VII**” with bold/italicized tasks). Note: table continues on page 13.

PHASE I SITUATION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE II CRISIS ASSESSMENT	PHASE III COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE IV COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION	PHASE V EXECUTION PLANNING	PHASE VI EXECUTION <i>DECISION</i>	PHASE VII EXECUTION
EVENT						
EVENT OCCURS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS	CC's REPORT ASSESSMENT RECEIVED	CJCS PUBLISHES WARNING ORDER	CC PRESENTS REFINED AND PRIORITIZED COA's TO NCA	CC RECEIVES ALERT ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER	NCA DECISION TO EXECUTE OPORD	CC EXECUTES OPORD
ACTION						
• COMBATANT COMMANDER (CC)* : MONITOR WORLD SITUATION	• CC : INCREASE MONITORING	• CC : DEVELOP COAs	• CJCS : GIVE MILITARY ADVICE TO NCA	• CC : ADJUSTS JOPEs DATA BASE	• CJCS : PUBLISH EXECUTE ORDER BY AT DIRECTION OF SECDEF	• CC : AS NECESSARY, SUBMITS REQUESTS FOR ADD'L FORCES ISO CURRENT & FUTURE OPNs
• CC : IDENTIFY PROBLEM	• CC : INCREASE REPORTING	• CC : EVALUATE COAs	• CJCS : MAY PUBLISH PLANNING ORDER TO BEGIN PLANNING BEFORE COA SELECTION	• CC : IDENTIFY MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT	• CC : MAINTAIN JOPEs DATA BASE & VALIDATES TPFDD	• CJCS : VALIDATES & RESPONDS TO REQUESTS, RESOLVES SHORTFALLS
• CC : SUBMIT CC's ASSESSMENT	• CJCS : ADVISE ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION	• CC : CREATE OR MODIFY JOPEs DATA BASE		• CC : IDENTIFY AND ASSIGN TASKS TO UNITS	USTRANSCOM : BEGINS DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS (C-Day)	USTRANSCOM : LNO PROVIDES ASSESSMENT DURING COA DEVELOP & EXECUTION
	• CJCS : NCA-JCS EVALUATION	• CC : ASSIGN TASKS TO SUBORDINATES BY EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE		• CC : PUBLISH OPORD OR CONVERT COA INTO OPORD & SUPPORTING OPORDs		USTRANSCOM : ISSUES W.O. TO SUBORD. COMMANDS (e.g., LIFT & TANKER SPT)
		• USTRANSCOM : PREPARE DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES		• CC : RESOLVE SHORTFALLS AND LIMITATIONS		USTRANSCOM : ADJUST TPFDD FLOW AS REQUIRED
		• CJCS : REVIEW COMMANDER'S ESTIMATES		• CC : INTENSIFY SORTS REPORTING		• JPEC : REPORT EXECUTION STATUS
OUTCOME						
• CC : REPORT ASSESSMENT MAY HAVE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS TO NCA/CJCS	• NCA/CJCS DECIDE TO DEVELOP MILITARY COAs	• CC PUBLISHES COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE WITH RECOMMENDED COA	• CC : NCA SELECTS COA • CJCS PUBLISHES SELECTED COA (WO/AO)	• CC PUBLISHES OPLAN (FOR PLANNING ORDER) OR OPORD (FOR ALERT ORDER)	• CC PUBLISHES EXECUTE ORDER	• CRISIS RESOLVED

Revised Flow Diagram for Crisis Action Procedures^{xxiv}

Finally, it is recommended that the Joint Staff establish a capability or cell to function as a permanent current operations team to address combatant command issues and/or requests in support of ongoing operations (vice ad hoc rotation of team members).² When not involved in supporting operations, the cell will administer the CJCS-sponsored exercise program in conjunction with the combatant command Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (SJTFHQ).

Areas Recommended for Combatant Command Involvement

The following recommendations focus on areas where the combatant commander's actions and involvement will greatly assist in improving deployment planning and execution responsiveness.

The first issue relates to the development of operations plans during the deliberate planning cycle in response to guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP serves as an important tool in the development of operation plans by providing the combatant commander with strategic guidance, tasks, apportionment of major combat forces, materiel, and lift assets. Although the Joint Staff is responsible for publishing the JSCP and planning schedules, the combatant commander plays a vital role in its review and refinement. In coordination with the Joint Staff and regional National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), combatant commands must ensure that CJCS planning guidance reflects realistic threat assessments (ambiguous versus unambiguous indicators) and adequate timelines (e.g. mobilization date (M-day), deployment operations (C-day), OPOD execution (D-day, H-hour, etc.). In other words, it is critically important that combatant

² Note: Team is not to be confused with the National Military Command Center's (NMCC) Operations Team responsible for monitoring events throughout the world.

commands, when necessary, challenge assumptions, timelines, and resource projections contained in the JSCP and other planning guidance documents.

Second, the combatant command planners must ensure operation plans take into account possible resource constraints in terms on manpower, equipment, and strategic lift in light of ongoing world events and potential threat activities. Operation plans must also consider the impact of austere, infrastructure constrained environments and identify actions to mitigate their negative effects on deployment operations. In Operation ALLIED FORCE, the U.S. Air Force conducted extensive beddown assessments for sites in NATO and Eastern European countries. These assessments proved to be critically important during the operation and allowed logistics planners to optimize finite strategic lift assets. Unfortunately, ground and sea infrastructure capabilities were not assessed until later in the operation which prevented planners from making informed decisions regarding the employment of Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) assets.^{xxv}

Third, in-transit visibility plays a vital role in making timely adjustments to the TPFDD (e.g., flow and/or types of forces). Technology has greatly enhanced our ability to communicate and to pass critical information to organizations involved in deployment planning and execution activities. Unfortunately, many commands have adopted "stovepipe" programs which in many cases are incompatible with other tools.^{xxvi} As previously mentioned, in FY 2002, the Joint Staff selected the Defense Collaborative Tools System (DCTS) as the DoD standard for deployment planning and execution activities. Unfortunately, standardization has not completely taken hold and many commands, continue to use the alternative tools (e.g., Interactive Work Station - IWS). The Joint Staff, Combatant

Commands, and Services must come to agreement on deployment tools and ensure their staffs adhere to standardization initiatives.

Fourth, short of war, combatant command exercise programs serve as an important tool for validating operation plans and addressing deployment timeline planning assumptions. These programs are especially useful when scenarios reflect suboptimal resource availability due to competing claimants for low density high, demand assets (e.g., munitions, combat systems, strategic lift, etc.). Unfortunately, many large-scale exercises accelerate or “assumed away” tedious, but important staff processes due to time constraints and competing training objectives.^{xxvii} In some cases, the use of deployment simulations can be used to exercise these critical staff processes while also providing the combatant commander with the flexibility to address multiple training objectives. In addition, the involvement of real world participants (vice role players) will greatly enhance an exercise’s realism and may identify/resolve significant deployment issues.

The fifth and final recommendation expands on a previous proposal regarding the involvement by “supporters” in planning process, especially after an operation has commenced. As mentioned, current doctrine and procedures provide the combatant commander with adequate deployment and execution guidance during the deliberate and crisis action planning phases, but provide limited guidance or delineation of responsibilities after crossing the “line of departure.” In many cases, USTRANSCOM has limited flexibility to adjust the first three to four days of strategic airlift and only marginal flexibility to modify the following three days of airlift. Unfortunately, many staffs fail to recognize these constraints and develop courses of action (COA) without fully evaluating their feasibility (and supportability). As result, valuable time is wasted on COAs that ultimately require

significant modifications or abandonment. Given these constraints and the difficulty associated with pre-positioning of global laydown, lift and tanker assets, it is extremely important that logistics and transportation personnel provide a “reality check” throughout all phases of COA development and execution.

Conclusions

It is fair to speculate that additional funding in terms of more forces, strategic lift, and sustainment assets will answer many of the concerns voiced by combatant commanders regarding deployment operations. Undoubtedly, there are areas that would greatly benefit from additional funding and that may indeed alleviate some of these issues. Unfortunately, economic realities prevent the funding of many of the deployment operation shortfalls. In this regard, efforts should continue to focus on areas, both at the department and combatant command levels that optimize finite resources while providing the commander with as much flexibility as possible.

After the United States’ highly successful military operations during the first Gulf War and subsequent actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is unlikely that future threats will allow deployment activities to take place unabated, especially if these events can be interdicted or disrupted. Although current doctrine and procedures logically focus on deliberate and crisis action planning, they fail to adequately address roles and responsibilities after an operation is underway and when flexibility and responsiveness are most needed. As a result, deployment policies and procedures must be refined in order to provide the combatant commander with the necessary resources to respond to threats across the spectrum of conflict in a timely and effective manner.

Finally, combatant commanders must demand logistician and transportation personnel involvement in all phases of an operation. By allowing these key individuals to actively participate in the post-line of departure planning environment, commanders will save valuable time in both synchronizing and validating courses of action. More importantly, once confidence is restored in the responsiveness of the Joint Deployment and Execution Planning System, the use of the highly inefficient and reactive RFF process will become more discretionary. In conclusion, these recommendations represent only the initial steps toward making the Joint Deployment Planning and Execution Process more responsive to the commander tasked with conducting military operations in a complex and turbulent world.

Endnotes

- ⁱ Kenneth Allard, Somalia Lessons Learned, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, January 1995.
- ⁱⁱ The National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, September 2002.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid., p. 3.
- ^{iv} Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, Washington, DC, June 2000.
- ^v Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEs) (Planning Policies and Procedures, Volume I), May 25 2001, p. C-4.
- ^{vi} Ibid., p. C-12.
- ^{vii} Ibid., p. C-13.
- ^{viii} Ibid., p. B-10.
- ^{ix} Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEs) (Planning Policies and Procedures, Volume I), May 25 2001, p. E-3.
- ^x Ibid., p. E-13.
- ^{xi} Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5158.8, Joint Deployment Owner, Washington, DC, November 12, 2001.
- ^{xii} Kenneth Allard, Somalia Lessons Learned, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, January 1995, p. 45.
- ^{xiii} Ibid., p. 43.
- ^{xiv} Ibid., p. 44.
- ^{xv} Ibid., p. 47.
- ^{xvi} Ibid., p.47.
- ^{xvii} Department of Defense (DoD) Report to Congress, Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report, Washington, DC, January 31, 2000, p. 34.
- ^{xviii} Ibid., p. 35.
- ^{xix} Ibid., p. 37.
- ^{xx} Ibid., p. 38.
- ^{xxi} Peter Pace, Prepared Remarks before the Defense Writers Group, Washington, DC, September 24, 2003.
- ^{xxii} U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Lessons Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom – Major Combat Operations (Coordinating Draft), Norfolk, VA., March 4, 2004.
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